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Operation of the British Excess Profits Duty Law
By Maurice E. Peloubet
It will, I think, be recognized everywhere that the legislation
adopted in England shortly after the outbreak of the great war,
and retrospective to the beginning of hostilities, for the purpose
of limiting abnormal profits, due to the war, was a departure in
financial legislation which, while urgently necessary, was at the
same time bold, new and opposed to some of the most strongly
marked tendencies in British commercial and financial, to say
nothing of economic and social, life.
For a nation so extremely individualistic as the British, much
more so I think than is the case with the United States, to submit
to a form of taxation which involved rigorous control of prac
tically every business and the taking over by the state of from
50% to 80% of a large proportion of what the proprietors of
those businesses thought was mostly the result of their own efforts
calls for respect for the taxpayers’ patriotism and far-sightedness
in submitting quietly and with considerable good nature to the
impost. No less does the adoption of such a measure by a gov
ernment nominally devoted to free trade and the “laissez faire”
principle, although with true British love of practicality and
compromise it had fathered some projects which could hardly be
distinguished from advanced state socialism, demand our ad
miration as a piece of courageous and constructive statesmanship.
It would be surprising, however, if such a measure turned
out to be perfect, or anything approaching it. The excess profits
duty has always been a workable and productive source of revenue.
It has undoubtedly had a calming effect on labor. It has now
been in operation so long that changes in fundamental principle
are practically impossible. The only use therefore in pointing
out the weaknesses of the British system of excess profits duty,
which I believe is much superior, in practice, to the French or
other European systems, is to make use of British financial and
economic mistakes and experience, as we have of British mistakes
and experience in other lines of war effort.
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The main features of the British excess profits duty are:
(1) The figure for normal or “standard” profits is, in most
cases, based on an average of any two of the last three
pre-war years.
(2) The taxpayer was allowed to retain at first 50%, then
40% and now, from January 1, 1917, onwards, 20%
of his profits above the normal in addition to,
(3) A percentage on net increase of capital, at first 6% and
from January 1, 1917, 9%, increased in special cases, such
as those of rubber companies whose plantations have
come into bearing after the outbreak of war or of new
business begun after the opening of hostilities, to as much
as double the statutory rate.
and, finally,
(4) In many cases very large so-called “depreciation allow
ances” have been made.
In all the following discussion it must be constantly held in
mind that in a country at war, in the modern sense, the govern
ment is both producer and consumer and buyer and seller, besides
being the universal employer.
The management and directors of a business are merely a
higher grade of state servants and their remuneration should not
be regarded as the “profits of the entrepreneur,” “wages of
capital” nor in any way other than as the payment by the state for
services rendered to the state with state property. For con
venience, much of the old forms and terminology is of course
still retained, but everyone in England realizes that his life, time
and money are at the disposal of the state at any time.
The great objects, then, in any law similar to the British excess
profits duty, are to ensure a fair and equitable reward for formerly
independent business men, managers or directors; to make
sure that any increase of this reward is based on real service
rendered, i.e., increased production or efficiency, and not by taking
advantage of conditions or opportunities in the creation of which
they had no part; and to make certain that increases of prices
are solely due to real causes, difficulty of transport, scarcity of
raw materials or actual increased living cost, rather than to any
financial causes or to manipulation of markets.
The British excess profits duty, to a large extent, does all
these things but falls short of complete success, chiefly on account
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of the method used in calculating “standard” profits; because it
allows a portion of the excess profits to be retained and because
in general the provisions of the law relate, almost solely, to the
financial side of business rather than to the productive or oper
ating side.
The fixing of standards for two companies in the same line of
business, say $100,000 each, might work out as follows:
Three pre-war years:

Year's selected by taxpayer:

Year 1911
1912
1913
Year 1911
1912

Standard profit

Co. “A”
$10,000
9,000
8,000
$10,000
9,000

Year 1912
1913

Co. “B”
$7,000
8,000
9,000
$8,000
9,000

$19,000

$17,000

$9,500

$8,500

Co. “A” clearly is declining and, presumably, is becoming less
efficient in operation while Co. “B” plainly is advancing.
Co. “A,” however, for four or more years gets the benefit of
a good year in 1911 while Co. “B” for the same period is penal
ized for mistakes committed in 1911 and 1912 and righted in
1913, besides getting nothing for what may be taken as a normal
rate of expansion or improvement.
If, as is usually the case, both companies are on government
work, there can be no question of normal expansion, ordinary
work being stopped. Whatever expansion takes place is to take
care of government orders. The pre-war profits of the individual
companies are no criterion of what their profit on government
work should be. Present production and efficiency rather than
past good luck or good management are what should rule in fixing
the reward for work performed under war conditions.
Yet some Standard must be adopted and can only be arrived
at from past results. It should, however, be so broadly based as
to form an index of the normal profit earning capacity of the
capital employed, not in an individual business or undertaking,
but in a trade or industry taken as a whole.
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The method of computing the amount of capital employed by
a company under the British excess profits duty law is sound
theoretically both from an economic and accounting point of view,
and the information can readily be extracted from any ordinary
set of financial books. The capital employed is taken to consist of:
1. Share capital;
2. The difference between accounts payable and receivable
added or deducted as the case may be;
4. Reserves;
5. Profits retained in the business.
Assets not used in the business are eliminated and if a com
pany were carrying forward a deficit it would be treated in the
opposite way to profits retained in the undertaking.
With this information as to capital and the figures for income
all on a uniform basis, as shown by income tax returns, the tax
ing authorities are in a position to determine what percentage
should constitute a fair return on capital employed in a particular
industry.
The present method of making adjustments of the rate of
return on capital for special industries is really an application
of this principle and proves it to be practicable.
It is, of course, true that there is a board of referees provided
for by the finance act to hear appeals for increases in the statutory
percentage or ip the case of certain inequitable assessments. This
board, however, deals with one variety of claims only—namely,
where the standard or percentage is too low. Of the assessments
where the present system is unduly favorable it is safe to say none
has ever been appealed against. The beneficiaries certainly would
not appeal. The taxation officers can only enforce the law as it
stands, and competitors have no means of getting the information
on which to found a protest or appeal.
It is these cases, however, which are the sources of the extrava
gance and inflation due to the excess profits duty law.
If the standard as suggested above were applied and any
increase in the profit allowed made contingent on and proportional
to an increase in production or turnover, in goods not money, a
reward for efficiency and energy would be provided which would
ensure that these were devoted productively rather than to market
manipulation or to securing a high selling price for the finished
products.
20
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No fraction, however small, of the excess profits, i. e., profits
above the standard for the trade or business modified by the pro
duction of the individual company under review, should be
retained by the taxpayer. If any part of such excess is retained
the taxpayer will simply raise prices sufficiently to cover the tax
and the increase desired as well. If no part of the excess is
retained and the increase allowed is fair and liberal there will be
no advantage to the taxpayer in inflated prices, while a financial
reward will be given for increased production.
Under the present system there is a strong and direct incentive
to raise prices and the smaller the percentage retained the higher
will prices go.
The fact that the government, being the purchaser, pays with
one hand and, being the taxing authority, receives with the other
seems to cancel the two amounts. If this were the case the trans
action would be merely ridiculous—but it is far worse than that,
for between payment of the price of the goods and collection of
the tax a long period elapses during which the amount of money
in the country is greatly increased and a large sum is placed in
the hands of firms out of which payments are made with great
liberality for “repairs,” “renewals,” “improvements,” “renova
tions,” etc.
At the same time a feeling of great generosity toward em
ployees, especially managers, departmental heads and executives
generally, seems to come over the company. Directors’ fees are
raised, bonuses and commissions are put on a higher level and
everything is easy and liberal. It is not quite such a strain to be
liberal where the government pays from a half to four-fifths, and
it is a matter of very great difficulty for the taxing authorities to
decide which of these various extraordinary payments are legiti
mate and which not. As a rule, all but the most flagrant instances
are passed by the revenue authorities as expenses, deductible
from the taxable profits.
What a firm cannot use in this way, it can leave in the business
and get 9% on or deposit on account of payments to be made and
get 5% until the tax is assessed. It can also buy war loan, say it
is money held in reserve and get the interest on the loan, count its
holding as increased capital and deduct interest received on loan
from interest at 9% on the amount and deduct the difference
from its taxable profits.
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It can thus be seen the government pays interest on its own
money until it collects it.
This system not only raises prices in particular industries but
raises them generally by causing inflation of the currency.
Although the American securities scheme, whereby substantially
all the main American securities held in Great Britain have been
bought by the government and sold in the United States, has kept
the exchange rate on New York almost to the gold point, consid
ering the increased cost of transportation and insurance, there is
undoubtedly very considerable inflation of the currency in Eng
land—surely as much and perhaps a little more than that indi
cated by the various exchange rates.
The government also tacitly permits, occasionally unwittingly,
the cost of whole plants to be taken out of what would be taxable
profit in two or three years, especially in the case of aircraft or
munition factories. It thus puts itself in the position of paying
for these plants and not owning them, which is certainly a liberal
method of providing for increased facilities if nothing else.
It is to be hoped that the United States government will not
stumble into any of the pitfalls into which the early framers and
administrators of the British excess profits duty law fell. They
can, I think, all be traced to the fixing of a standard based on past
results of individual companies, allowing any portion of the excess
profits to be retained, increase of profits following increase of
price, rather than increase of production or efficiency, and what
amounts to payment for plants which did not then become gov
ernment property.
It is easy, and so far as England is concerned useless, to criti
cize past mistakes in regard to the excess profits duty law. That
law has worked better than anyone thought it would and was a
measure of courageous and far-sighted statesmanship. I believe,
however, that some of these facts pointed out may help in forming
a public opinion which will tend to prevent the United States gov
ernment, in attempting to copy the good points of the British
excess profits duty law, from adopting the less advantageous ones.
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